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References  34 I  Introduction  and  Summary 
1.  Macro-economic  policies  tend  to  be  discussed  and  planned 
on  the premise  that  potential  output  and  its future  growth  path 
are given  or  can  only  be  influenced  by  mainly  macro-economic 
policies such  as 
-a demand  pull  for  unsustainable growth  <Layard  et al.  1984), 
- a  two-handed  approach,  expanding  supply  as  well  as  demand, 
with  emphasis  on  incomes  policies  (wage  moderation>  for 
higher  employment  <Blanchard  et al.  1985),  or 
a  two-handed  approach  with  emphasis  on  a  policy  mix  favouring 
capital  formation  <Modigliani  et al.  1986). 
Trade policies are  hardly  mentioned  in  this context;  belonging  to 
a  different  academic  discipline or  to  a  different  department  or 
ministry  in  national  administrations,  they  do  not  receive  much 
attention from  experts  in  the  monetary-fiscal  field.  This  paper 
argues  that  they  are  most  important. 
2.  Trade  theorists  and  trade negotiators,  on  the other  hand, 
often  take effective  demand  as  given.  While  theorists  tend  to 
assume  that relative prices are flexible  enough  to  permit  a  full 
(or  optimal)  use  of  resources,  including  labour,  practitioners and 
trade negotiatiors are  impressed  by  the reality of  unemployment 
and  the mercantilist  views  of  businessmen  <and  labour  leaders>  who 
believe  the  demand  for  output  (or  labour)  to  be  inadequate  most  of 
the  time  and,  therefore,  fear  that  the gains  from  trade will 
transform  themselves  into  output  losses  (and  unemployment).  Uni-
lateral steps to  freer  trade are therefore completely  ruled  out  in -2-
practice even  by  experts  who  feel  committed  to  the general  wel-
fare. 
3.  This  paper  is  an  att~mpt to  bring  the  two  sides  together. 
It will  demonstrate,  on  the  one  hand, 
that  internal  and  external  liberalisation of  trade  in  goods  and 
services does  substantially raise potential  output  and  its 
growth  path  and 
that  it,  therefore,  pays  to  anticipate  these gains  in  conceiving 
and  conducting  macro-economic  policies. 
On  the other  hand,  it will  be  argued  that  a  macro-economic  policy 
that  is trade oriented  and  forward  looking  in  this sense  would 
allow  trade negotiators and  deregulators  to  deemphasise  the direct 
losses of output  and  employment  expected  from  removing  restric-
tions  and  to  anticipate  a  pull  of  demand  that  will  facilitate  the 
transfer  of  resources  to  alternative uses. 
4.  In  dealing  with  both  internal  and  external  liberalisa-
tion,  the  paper  will  attempt  to  demonstrate  that  the  two  are 
complementary  to  a  considerable extent  and  that  it is,  therefore, 
advantageous  to  combine  both efforts  into  one  strategy. 
a)  One  chain of reasoning  is 
that  external  liberalisation requires domestic  adjustment 
which  is  likely  to  be  easier  where  markets for  alternative 
uses offer  an unrestricted entry; 
that  in  the  extreme case of  regions  dominated  by  declining 
industries,  nothing  short  of  experiments  with  "Free 
Enterprise Zones"  will  provide sufficient facility for  coping 
with  severe  adjustment  problems; 
- that  alternative uses  are not  limited  to  manufacturing  and 
that  for  the  advanced  countries of  Europe  the  internal 
deregulation of service activities is almost  a  prerequisite 
for  the full  liberalisation,  internal  and  external,  of  trade 
in goods; 
and  that  the external  liberalisation of  trade  in services as 
well  as  in goods  will  meet  with  great  complications unless  it 
is accompanied  by  internal  liberalisation,  deregulation and, 
perhaps,  privatisation. -3-
b>  The  other  reason for  combining  internal  and  external 
liberalisation stems  from  the consideration  that  the completion 
of  the  E.C.  Internal  Market  by  1992  is an  agreed  objective.  If 
it is to  be  achieved  in  time,  it will  involve  a  speeding  up  of 
structural  adjustment  in  many  areas.  An  inward-looking 
reorientation of  production  is  likely  to  cause  the  same  costs 
but  to  offer  much  less scope  for  static  and  dynamic  gains  from 
trade  than  a  reorientation that  simultaneously exploits 
Europe's opportunities  in  a  regime  of  free<r>  trade  on  a 
worldwide  scale.  This  becomes  most  plausible if 
one considers  that  free(r)  trade will  allow  the  world  economy 
to  raise output  and  employment  without  inflation and  to  speed 
up  its growth  of potential  output  by  a  significant margin. 
II  Openn•ss  and  Growth•  General  Principles and  Prospects 
5.  The  case for  liberalisation,  external  as  well  as  inter-
nal,  rests on  the case for  individual  freedom  and  competition  in 
open  markets.  When  markets  are  open  in  the sense  that barriers to 
entry  for  new  suppliers are  low,  customers. and  ultimate consumers 
can  safely expect  to  be  served  at  the  lowest  possible price,  at 
least  in  the  medium  run.  This  is because suppliers are under  the 
control  of potential  as  well  as actual  competition.  Artificial 
barriers to  entry built  by  governments  or  trade associations raise 
actual  prices above  competitive prices  thus permitting  producers
7 
rents at  consumers
7  expenses.  Moreover,  they  worsen  the  economic 
opportunities of  those  who  are excluded.  If this sounds  trivial, 
why  is it so  often  ignored  in practice? 
6.  The  economic  rent  obtained  by  closing  the  market  is at 
least partly consumed  on  the  spot.  It  is  transformed  into  unneces-
sary  expenses  and  sheer  waste,  slack  and  sluggishness,  a  lack  of 
innovative activities,  a  failure  to  quickly  learn from  other 
people
7 s  experience or  research.  Where  such  rents are  in potential 
supply,  they  will  invite rent-seeking activities.  Intelligent 
people  who  might  do  better elsewhere offer  their  specialised 
services for  lobbying  and  vote selling  in  the political  arena. 
Such  activities distort  the public  discussion of  economic  poli-
cies.  They  also  push  governments  to  further  intervene,  both  to 
protect  the rents from  erosion  and  to  support  groups suffering 
from  their discriminatory side effects. -4-
7.  Most  harmful,  perhaps,  are  the discouraging effects on 
outsiders.  The  latter  include potential  entrepreneurs  and  employ-
ers and  the  long-term  unemployed  at  home  and  abroad,  particularly 
in  less developed  countries  <LDCs>.  The  loss of  dynamism  on  this 
account  must  be  considerable,  given  the fact  that protection is 
mostly  sought  by  and  given  to  established  firms  and  employees, 
probably  discriminating  against  the  young,  at  least  indirectly.  In 
the  same  vein,  there  is reason  to  think  that restrictions are 
particularly harmful  for  people  with  a  high  motivation  level,  e.g. 
in countries  where  the  incentive system  is not  impaired  by  high 
marginal  taxes or  otherwise.  Hence  efforts to  improve  the  incen-
tive system  will  bear  their full  fruits only  if they  are  accompa-
nied  by  steps  towards  more  open  markets. 
8.  Openness refers  to  future opportunities as  well  as  to 
opportunities  in alternative markets.  The  avenue  towards  the 
future  is technical  progress;  and  investment  is the  means  to 
exploit  these opportunities.  Obstacles  to  innovative  investment 
must  slow  down  the process of structural  change.  They  are particu-
larly harmful  in advanced  countries where  large parts of  manufac-
turing  are  under  the  pressure of competition from  catching-up 
countries.  Indirectly,  these obstacles give rise to  protective 
measures  that  often merely  slow  down  the process of structural 
adjustment.  In  the final  analysis,  such  protection  is often only 
protection for  defensive  investments  which  involve  a  substitution 
of capital  for  labour  without  much  genuine  innovation.  Therefore, 
a  lack  of  openness vis-a-vis  the future  leads  to  what  trade  theo-
rists call  a  "reversal  of factor  intensities".  From  a  cosmopolitan 
point  of  view  this amounts  to  a  waste  of capital  in  a  world  short 
of  it. 
9.  Resistance against  technical  progress  and  against  inter-
nal  and  external  liberalisation must  be  expected  from  labour  when 
(i)  technical  progress has  a  labour  saving  bias  (saving  more 
labour  than capital)  and  (ii)  unemployment  rates are high. 
Both  sources of resistance have  a  common  ground:  an overpricing of 
labour.  This  is why  wage  moderation  is of central  importance.  The 
role of  wages  in creating  and  fighting  excessive  unemployment  need 
not  be  elaborated here  as  it has  been  well  emphasised  in  the E.C. 
Commission,s  "Cooperative Growth  Strategy"  <1985).  The  influence 
of  wage  pressures on  the nature of  technical  progress,  however,  is -5-
less well  understood.  This  is because  the  advance  of  technology  is 
often tacitly assumed  to  be  an  exogenous  factor,  unrelated  to 
relative scarcities.  But  just as  they  influence  the decision  to 
substitute capital  for  labour  in  investment  decisions,  distorted 
factor  prices  <excessive  wages  relative  to  interest rates,  de-
pressed  interest rates relative  to  wages>  lead  to  a  preference for 
labour  saving  over  capital  saving  options  in  new  technologies. 
And  even  if research  workers  are  not  explicitly told  what  to 
search  for,  they  will  tend  to  pursue paths of  inquiry  that  are 
expected  to  produce  results meeting  the  test of  market  efficiency. 
The  time  lag  involved  is presumably  long,  given  the fact  that 
fundamental  research  is often remote  from  applied  R&D  and  hence 
from  economic  considerations.  A  redirection of  technical  progress 
in favour  of capital  saving  can,  therefore,  take quite  a  while 
during  which  resistance against  technical  progress as  such  may 
remain  popular. 
10.  Popular  resistance against  imports  and  import  liberal-
isation comes  from  the  same  source.  The  reason  is 
- that  advanced  countries are expected  to  take  the  lead  in 
liberalisation, 
that  these countries  - apart  from  trading  among  themselves  -
largely  import  standardised  products  from  countries with  an 
ample  supply  of  labour  and  correspondingly  low  wages,  and 
- that  imports,  therefore,  tend  to  weaken  the relative position of 
labour  against capital. 
11.  Only  when  labour  is  in excess  demand  so  that  there  is an 
inflow of foreign  workers,  will  free<r>  imports  from  low  wage 
countries be  generally  welcome  - as  a  substitute for  foreign 
workers.  Free(r)  imports will  then  not  only  benefit  consumers  but 
also  producers:  entrepreneurs  and  firms  using  labour  intensive 
import  goods  as  inputs,  exporters of capital  and  capital  goods, 
skilled workers  who  are complementary  to  unskilled  labour,  and 
unskilled  workers  who  dislike their direct foreign competitors. 
These  circumstances prevailed  in  the  1960s  in  the E.C.  of  the Six. 
12.  In  present  circumstances  - high  unemployment  among  less 
skilled workers  - there  is only  a  much  more  limited  but  poten-
tially expanding  group  of  people  who  can  - apart  from  consumers  -
expect  to  clearly benefit  from,  and  hence  to  support,  internal  and -6-
external  liberalisation and  the faster  growth  that  will  go  along 
with  it. This  group  includes all  those  who  are actually or  poten-
tially complementary  to  unskilled  labour,  domestic  or  foreign. 
Examples  are:  savers,  suppliers of capital  and  of capital  goods 
(both  to  the domestic  market  and  to  foreign  markets>,  skilled 
workers,  persons supplying  and  acquiring  technical  knowledge  and 
human  capital.  In  a  longer  perspective,  the  importance of  poten-
tial  complementarity  should  not  be  underrated:  unskilled  workers 
may  make  themselves  complementary  to  the  labour  embodied  in  im-
ports or  replaced  by  them,  i.e.  they  can  acquire  the skills that 
face  a  high  income elasticity of  demand  in  the prospective growth 
process. 
13.  This  has  an  implication for  wage  policy.  Faster  growth, 
in  the  same  way  as  it raises  the  demand  for  savings  and  physical 
capital,  can  be  expected  to  require  a  much  more  expanded  supply  of 
human  capital.  Hence,  the skill differentials  in  the  wage  struc-
ture will  have  to  increase.  Indeed,  in  order  to facilitate  libe-
ralisation for  faster  growth,  these differentials  should  increase 
at  an  early stage of  the process,  perhaps  even  in anticipation of 
its start.  This  is most  acute  in structurally weak  regions.  If 
they  want  to  become  more  competitive,  they  have  to  lower  real 
wages  for  immobile  unskilled  labour  so  that  their  locations are 
more  attractive to  physical  capital.  And,  at  the  same  time,  they 
have  to  offer  higher  salaries  to  experts  and  mobile skilled  wor-
kers  in order  to  attract more  of  them  for  faster  productivity 
growth.  This  divergence  is  likely  to  strain interpersonal  rela-
tions  and  traditional  notions of equity. 
14.  Liberalisation for  faster  growth  thus  requires  a  social 
atmosphere  tolerant  towards  changes  in relative prices and  income 
differentials.  Growth  will  be  delayed  and  liberalisation resisted 
if people  have static or  backward  oriented notions of equity, 
justice,  and  fairness.  This  point  is  important  enough  in  the 
European  context  to  warrant  a  digression. 
- Static  notions of  justice and  equity,  as  they  governed  for 
centuries  in Europe's history,  implicitly refer  to  a  point  in 
time  or  to  a  group  reproducing  itself  in  the course of  time. 
Think  of  a  tribal  community  (on  a  subsistence  level>,  a  caste 
system or  a  stationary guild society  and  ask  yourself  behind -7-
the  veil  of  ignorance  about  your  own  position  - what  rule of 
fairness  you  would  want  to  approve  in order  to  limit  the  maximum 
economic  risk,  i.e.  premature death.  The  answer  most  probably 
would  be:  equality  to  the extent  necessary for  satisfying basic 
needs.  The  poorer  the society,  the  more  equality will  be called 
for. 
A  society  which  has  risen above  subsistence  levels without 
understanding  why,  will  still  instinctively approve  of  this rule 
of fairness  as  a  matter  of precaution or  cultural  lag.  Income 
differentials,  as  they  can exist  in wealthier  societies,  will 
then  have  to  be  defended  in  a  different  way,  e.g.  by  recourse  to 
god's  will  or  tradition.  A  materialistic  interpretation of 
history  - like Marxism  - shatters these normative foundations 
unless  society does  learn  to  understand  why  it has  become  rich. 
- A  notion of fairness  and  equity  that  allows  a  dynamic  interpre-
tation has  been offered  by  John  Rawls  <1971).  This  interpreta-
tion can  be  presented  as follows:  one  may  feel  justified  to  earn 
more  than  the social  minimum  and  even  more  than  the  average  if 
one's moving  ahead  somehow  benefits  the poorest  members  of  the 
group.  Charity  is the altruistic way,  tax  loyalty  the  legalistic 
way  of  paying  tribute  to  this fairness principle.  In  a  market 
system  the right  focus  will  be  on  actual  and  prospective 
relative prices.  As  indicators of useful  social  behaviour, 
relative prices correctly tell:  make  yourself  complementary  to 
the  poor.  By  purchasing  their products  and  by  hiring  their 
services  you  improve  the  poor  fellows'  terms  of  trade;  by  saving 
and  investing  you  augment  the capital  stock  and  contribute  to 
raising  labour  productivity;  and  by  performing  the entrepre-
neurial  function  you  pave  the  way  to  new  opportunities for  your 
collaborators,  your  customers,  and  even  your  imitators.  In  the 
tribal  community,  the chief  is supposed  to  deserve  a  better 
living  as  a  reward  for  his  lifetime  leadership  in  the  war 
against  the  enemy,  human  or  ecological.  In  a  dynamic  society, 
the  heroes  are  economic  frontrunners,  including  entrepreneurs 
who  earn  <transient>  extra profits for  being  (temporarily>  ahead 
of other  people.  They  benefit  the  latter by  pulling  them  along 
or  by  inspiring  them  to  follow suit. -8-
15.  Apart  from  equity,  Europe  is strongly  concerned  with 
social  security.  It  is  true  that faster  growth,  once  achieved, 
allows  improvements  in  the social  security net,  thus benefitting 
those  unable  to  adjust;  but  extended  notions of  social  security 
once  embodied  in  institutions - must  sooner  or  later  be  expected 
to  produce  moral  hazard,  i.e.  to  reduce  the  incentive or  pressure 
to  adjust  and  to  induce  more  reliance  on  external  protection  and 
subsidies.  The  welfare state may  not  be  observably  harmful  when 
adJustment  requirements are relatively  small  under  conditions of 
fast  straightforward  growth  - as  in  the  1960s;  but  this  no  longer 
holds  when  growth  slows  down  while structural  change  accelerates 
- as  in  the  1970s  under  various supply  shocks  and  increasing 
competition  from  the  NICs.  Moreover,  it probably  takes  time for 
behaviour  to  adapt  to  a  different  incentive system.  This  is as 
important  for  the future,  should  incentives be  improved,  as  it was 
for  the  past  when  incentives for  economic  achievement  and  growth 
were  impaired  by  the  expansion of  the  welfare state. 
16.  Protectionism,  internal  and  external,  is an  outgrowth  of 
a  security-minded  mentality:  nobody  is ever  to  lose.  But  then 
there will  be  few  to  gain.  In  the  framework  of Paretian welfare 
economics,  the gainers are  supposed  to  compensate  the  losers.  But 
compensation  in actual  practice may  have prohibitive costs.  A 
compensating  society  may  thus  be quite stagnant.  A  way  out  is to 
adopt  a  longer  perspective.  Hicks  once  suggested  the 
principle that  in  the  longer  run  everybody  will  be  faced  with 
opportunities  to  gain  from  change.  To  be  widely  acceptable  this, 
however,  requires  that  individuals 
.  have  a  life expectancy  high  enough  to  warrant  such  hope  and 
.  have  accumulated  sufficient savings  to  survive during  the 
interval 
.  or  can  rely  on  the  family  or  on  government  support. 
A  young  and  wealthy  population with  strong  family  ties will  accept 
more  change  and  growth  without  actual  compensation.  This  suggests 
that  governments  would  be  well  advised  to  concentrate their offer 
of  help  to  those elderly  who  are poor  and  cannot  rely  on  the 
family.  The  latter could,  if faced  with  severe  income  losses  from 
external  and  internal  liberalisation,  be  pensioned  off,  often at 
less cost  to  society  than  the  customary  maintainance subsidies. 
Apart  from  this,  private savings  and  private property  deserve -9-
promotion  as  means  of  protecting  individual  livelihood  in  a  period 
of fast  change.  Transforming  the  income  tax  into  an  expenditure 
tax,  e.g.,  would  go  into  this direction.  So  would  the privatis-
ation of  socialised enterprises. 
17.  Recent  shifts  in  public  opinion  in  many  parts of  the 
world  are  an  indication  that  individualism  and  self-responsibility 
have  improved  prospects.  Many  small  countries  in  Asia  successfully 
changed  from  inward-looking  to  outward-looking  policies.  The 
People  s  Republic  of  China  shows  strong  tendencies of  domestic  and 
international  liberalisation  - paralleled  by  a  switch  to  deregu-
lation,  privatisation and  market  orientation  in  a  number  of coun-
tries  in  the  West.  Similar  trends are observable  in  large  firms 
which  lay  greater  emphasis ·on  the decentralisation of  decision 
making  and  on  profit participation.  Even  the Soviet  system,  under 
new  leadership,  seems  to  enter  a  period  of reform.  Such  changes 
may  be  temporary  and  subject  to  a  partial  rollback.  But  the  infor-
mation  revolution  which  is pushing  towars decentralisation  -
despite Orwell  - is irreversible.  It definitely  lowers  the  costs 
of  communication  and  should,  therefore,  give  a  lasting  impulse  to 
a  process of  growth  acceleration cum  liberalisation. 
18.  After  more  than fifteen years  of relative stagnation, 
Europe  in  the  second  half of  the  1980s  should  find  itself ready 
for  a  programme  that  would  greatly help  to  initiate a  new  spurt  in 
economic  development.  At  the  time  of writing  (1986),  the cyclical 
position of  its economy  warrants  the  new  optimism  that  has  gained 
ground  despite worsened  export  prospects.  Based  on  the  success of 
past anti-inflation policies  in all countries and  of  fiscal  con-
solidation  in  some  of  them,  confidence  in relative price  level 
stability  in  the near  future  is strong.  It could  be  maintained  for 
a  longer  period  of  time,  even  with  stronger  demand,  if  a  policy of 
moral  suasion for  wage  moderation  were  combined  with  an  incomes 
policy of  liberalisation and  market  flexibility.  Never  during  the 
last  15  years have  prospective conditions for  such  a  programme 
been  better  than  now. -10-
III  Openness  and  Growth:  The  Empirical  Evidence 
19.  A  4-5  per  cent  growth  of  industrial  economies  in  the 
1950s  and  1960s  went  along  with  the  opening  of  markets,  while  a 
2-3  per  cent  growth  in  the  1970s  and  1qsos  was  paralleled  by 
rising  protectionism,  both  within  and  among  countries.  Before  the 
background  of  the  preceeding  discussion,  this  is  no  surprise.  It 
gives  an  indication of  the  magnitude  involved:  the subject  of  this 
paper  is  a  difference of  two  percentage points per  annum  in real 
economic  growth.  Up  to  a  degree,  mutual  causation  seems  to  have 
been  at  work:  a  virtuous circle  in  the first period,  a  vicious 
circle  in  the  second  one. 
a)  The  virtuous circle could  be  observed  in  West  Germany,  when 
the dismantling  of  many  controls after  1948  created  room  for  an 
unexpected  rise  in productivity  that  left real  wages 
behind,  thus  increasing  the  demand  for  labour  and  promoting  a 
positive  sum  game  mentality  in favour:of  (i)  ,open  product 
markets,  (ii)  convertibility on  cap~tal ·a~tount,  (iii)  a  free 
inflow  of  guest-workers  and  (iv)  a  technology  transfer  from  the 
U.S.  uninhibited  by  fears  of  technological  unemployment. 
Germany  took  several  unilateral  steps  towards  import 
liberalisation and  lower  tariffs - ahead  of  schedule  - for 
inviting  competition as  a  means  to  maintain  price  level 
stability.  This  helped  to  accelerate  the  formation  of  the  E.C. 
Common  Market. 
b)  The  vicious circle dominated  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  in  most 
industrial  countries.  Its trade  component  was  the  New 
Protectionism of  non-tariff-barriers  <NTBs>  (comprising  the 
Multi-Fiber-Arrangement  <MFA>,  bilateral  import  quotas,  import 
licensing,  orderly  market  arrangements  <DMAs>,  voluntary  export 
restraint  agreements  <VERs),  safeguard  measures,  the 
restrictive application of  standards,  anti-dumping  quarrels, 
and  the  (competitive>  granting of  subsidies  to  domestic 
producers>.  The  products  mainly  covered  were  exports  from 
countries  <NICs>  which  have  embarked  upon  an  outward  looking 
catching-up  process.  The  purpose  was  to  prevent  or  delay  the 
displacement  of  domestic  labour,  primarily  in old  industrial 
regions  on  the  European continent.  Protectionism,  it could  be -11-
observed,  tended  to  feed  on  itself.  By  permitting  more 
sluggishness  <X-inefficiency>  it  impaired  the  growth  of 
productivity  and  output,  while  less growth  reduced  the  dynamic 
margin  where  structural  change  can  take  place without  pain. 
This  in  turn raised  the  demand  for  protection  in  the political 
arena. 
20.  The  strongest statistical  evidence for  a  negative  impact 
of external  protection  on  growth  is supplied  in  a  comparative 
study  covering  32  developing  and  5  industrial  countries  by  Heitger 
(1986>.  The  mean  effective rate of  protection of  this sample 
<which  includes  the  E.C.  6  as  one  country>  accounts for  a  retarda-
tion of  economic  growth  by  1.9 percentage points  <on  average per 
annum  in  the  1960s  and  1970s>.  This  finding  is based  on  a  produc-
tion function-type  analysis  employing  - as  variables explaining 
economic  growth  -
(i)  the  adult  literacy rate as  a  proxy  for  human  capital, 
(ii)  the  share of  investment  in  GDP, 
(iii)  the rate of  population growth  as  a  proxy  for  labour, 
<iv>  per  capita  income  relative  to  that  of  the  U.S.  as  a  proxy 
for  the  technological  adaptation potential,  and 
<v>  the effective rate of  protection. 
As  technology  transfer  goes  along  with  trade  and  as  it  is more 
important  for  developing  than  for  developed  countries,  one  may 
conclude  that  openness  is even  more  beneficial  for  the  former  than 
for  the  latter  - as  it  was  for  Europe  during  the  postwar  process 
of  catching-up  in relation to  the  U.S.A. 
21.  Other  studies point  in  the  same  direction: 
a)  For  a  sample  of  41  developing  countries  in  the  1950s  and 
1960s,  Michaely  (1977>  demonstrated  that  a  higher  share of 
exports  in  GOP  was  positively correlated with  per  capita  income 
growth. 
b)  Applying  a  production function-type  relationship  in  a  study  of 
ten semi-industrialised countries,  Balassa  (1978)  found  that 
export  growth  for  the  1966  to  1973  period  matters  in explaining 
why  growth  rates differ.  Per  capita  growth  in South  Korea,  e.g., -12-
would  have  been  42  per  cent  less had  this country  achieved 
merely  the  average  export  growth  rate of  the sample. 
c>  Michalopoulos  and  Jay  <1973)  and  Krueger  (1978>  provide  addi-
tional  evidence for  a  positive correlation between  export  expan-
sion  and  income  growth. 
d)  Finally  we  know  from  case studies  that  trade  liberalisation  in 
developing  countries  went  along  with  faster  growth.  Krueger 
<1983)  and  Donges  and  MUller-Ohlsen  <1978>  report  that  a  change 
from  import  substitution to  outward-looking  policies  led  to 
higher  rates of  economic  growth  in  many  cases.  Even  after  the 
oil  shocks  of  1973  and  1979,  outward  oriented  developing  coun-
tries had  a  much  better  growth  performance  than  those  LDCs  which 
pursued  a  strategy of  import  substitution  <Balassa  1981;  Lal  and 
Rajapatirana,  forthcoming>. 
22.  A  clue  to  the question  why  import  liberalisation has 
favourable  effects on  growth  can  be  inferred  from  studies  <Heitger 
1983)  which  show  that  a  country~s international  sector  usually  has 
a  higher  productivity  growth  rate  than  the  domestic  sector.  The 
traditional  view  equates  the  international  sector  with  industry 
and  identifies the  mechanism  behind  its produtivity performance  as 
the exploitation of  scale economies.  Instead,  the  present  author 
suggests  to  focus  on  competition as  the explanatory factor  as will 
be  explained  below  <para  32>.  This  competition  is the driving 
force,  whether  or  not  substantial  economies  of  scale exist. 
With  import  liberalisation,  the sheltered domestic  sector  will 
shrink,  and  firms  exposed  to  international  competition will  speed 
up  their  productivity  growth.  The  same  can  be  expected  from  an 
increase  in competition due  to  deregulation. J) 
-13-
IV  Int•rnal Liberalisation•  Comment•  on  the E.C.  White Paper 
23.  "The  probability of forced  efficiency under  the pressure 
of foreign competition has  become  one of  the weightiest  arguments 
for  the  formation  and  extension of  custums  unions.  Not  that  world-
wide free  trade  would  not  be far  more  effective  in  removing  domes-
tic restrictions on competition;  but  political  resistance  to  it 
se~ms insuperable.  But  the  same  vested  interests as  are fiercely 
opposed  to  global  free  trade are willing  to  ~cope
7  with  regional 
free  trade,  and  some  loosening  of  monopoly  positions can  be  ex-
pected  also  from  a  regional  common  market.  It  is not  forgotten, 
however,  that  many  politically influential  industrial  groups  have 
accepted  the establishment  of  the  common  market  only  in  the  hope 
that cartels and  mergers will  succeed  in averting  the outbreak  of 
unlimited  competition  among  producers".  This  statement  by  Fritz 
Machlup,  then President of  the  International  Economic  Association 
during  its Fourth  Congress  in  1974  <Machlup  1976),  perfectly 
describes  the present  author
7 s  position as  an  economist,  on  the 
relative  importance of  the  European Council's determination since 
1982,  to  complete  the  internal  Common  Market  in  the  near  future, 
specified  in  1985  to  be  the  period  until  1992. 
24.  In  commenting  on  the  E.C.  Commission,s  White  Paper  of  June 
1985,  the  subsequent  paragraphs will  continue  the preceeding  line 
of reasoning  and  stress the  dynamic  rather  than  the static aspects 
of competition.  The  judgements,  factual  or  value oriented, 
underlying  this reasoning  can  be set  out  as  follows: 
(i)  Competition,  in  a  world  of uncertainty  and  limited  know-
ledge,  is  "a  process of discovery"  <Hayek  1968>;  we  do  not  know 
a  priori  what  situation is superior,  but  producers  engaged  in 
competitition will  make  experiments. (i)  to  reveal  their  custom-
ers,  preferences,  (ii)  to  improve  products  and  (iii)  to  lower 
their  costs.  Those  who  have better  hypotheses  will  see  them 
corroborated  <Popper  1959>  in  the  market;  others will  imitate 
them  or  launch  improved  hypotheses  if their  previous  tests ·have 
failed;  competition,  just  as research,  never  reaches  a  stage 
that  could  be called  "perfect". -14-
(ii>  While  product  innovations  (including  product  differentia-
tion>  are  a  means  of  sensing  consumers'  preferences,  process 
innovations raise total  factor  productivity  <X-efficiency>  by 
exploiting  new  knowledge,  technical  and  organisational.  As  the 
stock  of  this  knowledge  is growing  all  the  time,  competitive 
pressures  to  exploit  it should,  in principle,  be  maintained 
even  if this were  at  the  expense  of  short  run  gains  from 
monopolisation  <mergers)  and  cartelisation  (cooperation>. 
(iii)  In  a  European  context,  mergers  and  inter-firm cooperation 
are  the  less tolerable,  the greater  is  the protection against 
competition  from  third countries  <external  protection>  and  vice 
versa. 
(iv>  Competition  cannot  be fair  to  producers without  being  unfair 
to  consumers  or  to  those  whom  rules of fairness  exclude  from  the 
market.  Severe  competition  which  eliminates participants is 
mostly  the result of repressed  competition:  previous cartel 
arrangements,  regulation,  or  outside protection.  It should, 
therefore,  not  be  blamed  on  the principle of  liberal  markets~ 
<v>  Subsidies from  governments distort or  weaken  competition, 
but  they  do  not  lead  to  genuine discoveries  <that  would  not  have 
been  made  anyway.  This  holds  for  maintenance  subsidies which 
merely  slow  down  adjustment,  but  often also  for  R&D  subsidies 
which  fail  to  create  a  corresponding  research  capacity. 
(vi)  Norms  imposed  by  governments  limit  the  process of  search  for 
better  products  and  processes  in compliance  with  consumer  pre-
ferences  and  should,  therefore,  not  be  established  as  European 
norms  except  perhaps as  minimum  requirements  necessary  to  pre-
vent  negative  non-pecuniary externalities.  Scale economies  from 
norms  stimulate competition or  agreements  among  firms  and  will, 
therefore,  be fully  exploited  by  the  market. 
<vii)  Norms  and  standards for  products established  in  one  member 
country  should  be  considered  sufficient  in all  other  member 
countries,  particularly if consumers  receive  information about 
the  standard  prevailing  in  the country  of origin  <Cassis  de 
Dijon doctrine>. - 15-
(viii>  This  country  of origin-principle which  is applicable  to 
goods  should  also  cover  services.  There  is nothing  inherent  in 
the nature of services  that  could  warrant  a  different  treatment. 
<ix>  As  regards  taxation,  the country-of-origin principle already 
applies  to  direct  taxes;  it should  equally  apply  to  indirect 
taxes.  Then  entire national  tax  systems  would  compete  with  each 
o thet-. 
25.  There  is common  ground  between  the  propositions  advanced 
in  this paper  and  the  White  Paper  where  the  latter states 
- that all  controls at  the  internal  borders should  be  abolished  by 
1992  <para  1,  para  27>; 
- that  this requires  the  removal  of all  national  (and  regional> 
import  quotas  <para  35)  and  that  if such  quotas  would  still be 
allowed  according  to  Article  115  of  the  EEC  Treaty  they  should 
no  longer  be  administered  at  the frontier  (para  36>; 
- that  all  restrictions on  imports  imposed  under  Article  108  EEC 
Treaty  for  balance  of  payments  reasons  that  are applicable at 
internal  frontiers will  have  to  be  renounced  (para  37>; 
- that  the  CAP  <Common  Agricultural  Policy>  has  to  be  adjusted  to 
the effect  that  border controls  become  unnecessary  <para  38>; 
- that,  in order  to  avoid  border  controls,  trucking  should  be 
deregulated  <para  44,  para  109>; 
- that  domestic  authorities should  have  less power  to  regulate 
prices,  capacities  and  entry  in  the field  of civil  aviation 
<para  109 >; 
that  national  regulations should  be  harmonised  with  the  proviso 
that  they  are  limited  to  what  health  and  security considerations 
compellingly  require  <para  65>; 
- that  the  "Cassis  de  Dijon Principle"  (according  to  which  all 
goods  complying  with  the  legal  requirements of  the country  of 
origin should  have  free  access  to  all  countries of  the  Communi-
ty>  should  be  widely  applied  <para  58,  para  77>; 
- that  this  same  principle should  also  be  applied  to  financial 
services  <para  102,  para  103>; 
- that  freedom  of  professional  services  should  be  accomplished  for 
doctors,  lawyers  and  others  who  want  to  settle in countries 
which  require permission  on  the basis of  professional  and  aca-
demic  qualifications  <para  91>; -16-
that factual  discrimination of foreigners  in public  procurement 
procedures  should  be  abolished  <para  85>; 
- that  national  exchange  control  measures,  if any,  should  not  be 
administered  at  the  border  <para  132). 
27.  There  are  three  major  points of  possible disagreement. 
The  White  Paper  pleads for  European  industrial  norms  (para  65), 
although  admitting  that  a  mutual  recognition of national  norms 
would  provisionally  do.  This  assumes  that  common  technical  norms 
are  advantageous  independent  of  how  they  are established.  It 
ignores  that  norms,  apart  from  promising  economies  of scale and 
having  an  information  content,  tend  to  close opportunities for 
technological  advance  and  definitely reduce  the variety of pro-
ducts  available on  the  market.  These  advantages  come  into  full 
consideration  and  are sufficiently weighed  against  the  advantages 
flowing  from  scale economies  only  when  norms  arise from  a  process 
of  trial  and  error  under  conditions of  competition  among  many  or 
even  few  suppliers.  It  is true  that  the selection of  norms  by  the 
market  may  not  be  perfect.  But  if committees of  technicians decide 
<or  merely  suggest  for  decision by  authorities),  technical  consid-
erations are  most  likely  to  override consumers'  preferences  and 
the  aspect  of opportunity costs.  This  danger  is presently  enhanced 
by  two  trends: 
<i>  Strict product  liability is becoming  a  major  concern under 
the  influence of  American  legal  practice;  it may  lead  to  an  ex-
cessive caution on  behalf of  technicians  and  producers  without 
regard  to  the  moral  hazard  effect  that  is likely  to  arise  if 
consumers  are  made  to  believe that  consumer  goods  are guaranteed 
fool  proof. 
<ii)  The  Tschernobyl  nuclear  energy  accident  is  likely  to  raise 
emotional  concerns  about  security  in  many  other fields.  If 
authorities become  more  and  more  involved  in fixing  standards, 
the security associated  with  them  will  be  considered  a  public 
good  that  has  benefits without  any  costs.  In  these circumstances 
politicians and  bureaucrats as  well  as  the  technical  experts 
advising  them  will  push  for  excessive rather  than  minimum  stan-
dards  thus unintentionally closing  the  market  to  new  entrants or 
competitors  from  other  countries. (4) 
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28.  The  White  Paper  also  goes  too  far  in calling for  a 
policy  to  promote  industrial  cooperation  (para  133>.  It  ignores 
the  general  tendency  among  producers of  the  same  trade  to  form  im-
plicit or  explicit cartels at  the  expense of customers  and  final 
consumers.  The  language of  the  Book  in  this section  - with  appeal 
to  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  - allows  this  interpreta-
tion.  Even  different  mentalities  and  habits are  seen  as  obstacles 
to  cooperation,  as  if maximum  cooperation rather  than  optimum 
competition  were  the goal. 
29.  The  greatest difference of  opinion or  judgement  exists 
with  regard  to  indirect  taxes,  notably  VAT  levels.  The  White  Book 
pleads for  an  almost  complete  harmonisation of  these  levels  <para 
175>  thus  implicitly endorsing  the principle of  the country of 
destination as it is presently applied  in  intra-European  and 
international  trade.  It  ignores  the alternative principle of  the 
country of origin which  - for  other  features of  the product  - is 
embodied  in  the Cassis  de  Dijon decision.  This alternative princi-
ple takes all  taxes,  direct  and  indirect,  as producers'  taxes or 
as  an  equivalence for  the government's  supply  of public  goods  that 
improve  economic  conditions prevailing  in  the producer's country 
or  location  <Giersch  1962,  Sievert  1964,  Wissenschaftlicher  Beirat 
beim  Bundesministerium fur  Wirtschaft,  1986).  It  leaves  the  mix  in 
the financing  of  these public  goods  <the  mix  between direct  and 
indire·ct  taxes>  to  the country  of origin which  can fully  take  into 
account  the specific  tax  mentality  and  the  traditions of  the 
population.  Under  this alternative principle border  controls can 
be  removed  without  a  harmonisation of  VAT  levels. 
The  switch,  however,  requires  an  adjustment  of  exchange  rates. 
This  is so  because  the present  system contains  an  apparent  element 
of protection for  producers  in countries with  relatively high  VAT 
levels:  imported  substitutes for  domestic  products are subject  to 
high  VAT  rates at  the  border  while  goods  exported  are free of 
them.  The  protection  involved  is apparent  only  since it is 
(largely)  matched  by  a  correspondingly  higher  valuation of  the 
exchange rate.  To  put  it differently:  the  exchange rate effect 
means  that  countries with  relatively high  VAT  levels are relative-
ly expensive countries for  tourists who  pay  the  same  prices as 
domestic  consumers.  The  present  system  thus discriminates against -18-
tourism  in countries with relatively high  VAT  levels.  The  exchange 
rate adjustment  that  will  go  along  with  the  switch  is thus  a 
devaluation.  Apart  from  benefitting  tourism,  it serves as  a  com-
pensation for  the  withdrawal  of  the apparent  element  of  protec-
tion.  In  a  similar  way,  countries with  relatively  low  VAT  levels 
would  have  to  upvalue  their  currency.  Apart  from  becoming  less 
attractive for  tourists,  these countries offer  practically  the 
same  locational  advantages  (or  disadvantages)  as  they  do  now:  the 
tax  switch  that  appears  to  benefit  their  producers  is matched  by  a 
revaluation  that  withdraws  this benefit.  But  note  that  exchange 
rate adjustments can  cope  only  with  differences  in  VAT  levels; 
they  do  not  affect  differ~nces in  the structure of  tax  rates.  Some 
harmonisation of  the structures will  therefore be  inevitable even 
under  the country-of-origin-principle.  The  same  applies  to 
specific national  ta~es on  consumers's  goods.  Fixing  the rate for 
these  taxes  would  remain  a  national  prerogative,  albeit  limited  by 
the  market  <smuggling>  except  for  goods  to  be  registered  <e.g. 
cars>. 
30.  Nevertheless,  the principle of destination can  be  ap-
plied,  even  without  border  controls,  albeit with  some  imperfec-
tions,  even  if levels of  VAT  rates remain different.  Technically, 
the procedures of  payment  would  be shifted  from  frontiers  to  the 
locations of  the  importers,  as  the  White  Paper  suggests.  The  im-
porter  would  inform  the exporter,  certified  by  his  tax  authori-
ties,  that  he  paid  his  VAT.  This declaration would  allow  the 
exporter's  tax  authority  to  reimburse  the  VAT,  and  knowing  this, 
the exporter  would  contract for  a  price without  VAT  to  begin with. 
Difficulties would  arise  in  the case of direct  consumer  purchases 
<mail  order,  tourism)  if VAT  rates are substantially different; 
here  the  principle of  the country of origin would  have  to  apply 
for  simplicity's sake.  It would  be  a  competitive element  welcome 
as  a  brake for  the  national  governments'  propensity  to  raise  VAT 
rates. 
31.  Apart  from  border  controls,  the  internal  market  for 
industrial  products  is still fragmented  by 
(i)  discriminating public  procurement, 
(ii)  public  aid  to  industry, 
<iii)  favouritism:  special  treatment  of public  enterprises 
<according  to  Article 90>. - 19-
The  economic  costs of  this fragmentation  have  not  yet  been care-
fully assessed,  but  they  must  be  enormous  in  terms of  the  welfare 
of  consumers  and  taxpayers.  Pelkmans  (forthcoming>  gives  a  rough 
indication of  the order  of  magnitude  of direct costs: 
•  something  like  ten  per  cent  of  the  ECU  400  billion annual 
procurement  expenditure- i.e.,  ECU  40 billion- <Albert 
and  Ball,  1983>, 
.  a  similar  amount  <ECU  32  billion  in  1981>  of sectoral, 
regional,  industrial,  export  and  fiscal  aid,  mostly  for 
steel. 
In  addition,  there are  indirect costs from  a  distortion of compe-
tition due  to  the fact  that  trade  and  competition  in  medium-tech 
and  high-tech  products  are  hampered  and  distorted  because coun-
tries usually  do  not  yet  mutually  recognise national  test certi-
ficates  and  because  governments  or  public  agencies discriminate 
against  foreign suppliers.  In  the field  of  low-tech  products 
<steel,  textiles,  clothing,  ceramics,  glass)  internal  competition 
is distorted  because external  protection  is combined  with  internal 
impediments  to  trade  and  adjustment  (subsidies). 
32.  It  is worth  repeating  in  this connection  that  these 
impediments  to  trade  and  adjustment  not  only  involve costs on 
static allocation account;  more  important  is that  they  slow  down 
the productivity advance.  This  we  can  infer  from  a  study  already 
quoted  <Heitger  1983)  which  compares  the superior  productivity 
performance of  the  international  sectors of national  economies 
with  that of  the domestic  and  sheltered sectors.  The  usual  expla-
nation for  the different productivity  performance  is  that  the 
international  sector  largely comprises  industrial  activities which 
are associated  with  increasing  returns.  The  present writer,  in 
contrast,  maintains  that  the essential  difference  is the strength 
of  the challenges from  competition.  Increasing  returns  to  scale 
are  no  free  lunch,  no  mannah  from  heaven.  They  must  be  paid  for  in 
the  form  of  heavy  initial  investments  due  to  indivisibilities.  It 
is,  so  to  speak,  only after  having  driven  an  uphill  road  that  one 
can exploit  the cost  advantages of  a  downhill  ride.  Whether  there 
is any  net  saving of gasoline or  time  by  riding  up  and  down  in 
comparison  to  driving  on  a  plain is highly doubtful;  but  driving 
in competition will  certainly result  in  a  higher  performance 
level,  either  in  terms of  time  or  cost  saving.  The  association of -20-
industry  and  long  run  increasing returns appears  to  be  a  false 
generalisation from  the historical  episode of  industrialisation 
when  new  knowledge,  which  is really what  matters,  found  its way 
into  the  economy  mainly  via  industrial  investment.  This  is no 
longer  the case. 
33.  It  is the  function  of competition from  the  NICs  (from 
11below
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)  to  push  European  producers  into  product  and  process 
innovations  - as  an  alternative to  decay  - or  into  a  move  to  low 
wage  countries  (locational  innovations)  within  and  outside  the 
E.C ••  External  protection and  intra-E.C.  fragmentation  offer  only 
some  additional  time  for  adjustment.  But  whatever  time  European 
firms  gain  in this way,  they  are  likely  to  lose  when  they  meet 
with  barriers to  entry  in  the  new  environment  or  in  the  more 
sophisticated markets.  Fragmentation  and  protection thus  reduces 
the  speed  in  which  resources  can  move  from  low-tech  to  medium-tech 
and  from  there  to  high-tech  activities.  This  speed  will  determine 
Europe's overall  technological  competitiveness  in  the  next  dec-
ades.  It is  in this sense  that  the  completion of  the  Internal 
Market  as  a  competitive  market  will  be  decisive for  Europe's role 
in  the world  economy. 
34.  The  White  Paper  is  a  milestone  in  the development  of  the 
Community.  It deserves  more  publicity  than  it so  far  received.  It 
is not  only  comprehensive  but  also  specific  enough  to  catch  the 
citizens'  imagination.  The  timetable it contains could  well  become 
an  instrument  of public  pressure.  Nevertheless,  it is weak  or 
vague  in several  respects,  e.g.  on  aid  to  industry  <only  an  inven-
tory  of state aid  is foreseen  by  1986),  on  regional  policy,  on 
public  procurement,  and  on  the deficit financing  of public  firms. 
Hope,  however,  is warranted  that  the actual  removal  of  border 
controls will  induce further  steps  towards  liberalisation  in  the 
fields of agriculture  (where  monetary  compensatory  amounts  would 
become  impossible),  transportation and  imports  from  external 
sources  (where  it would  become  impossible  to  apply  national  quotas 
under  the  Mul_ti-Fibre-Arrangement  or  to  effectively protect  na-
tional  industries by  means  of  Voluntary  Export  Restraint  arrange-
ments. 
35.  Agriculture  and  external  liberalisation will  be  treated 
in subsequent  parts of  the  paper.  This  brings  us  to  the  problems 
of  transportation and  other  services.  Services cover  the field  of -21-
invisible trade.  This  trade  is so  difficult  to  liberalise because 
services are  mostly  subject  to  regulation  by  national  authorities. 
In  transport,  as  in other fields,  the  deeper  reason  for  regulation 
is protection,  i.e.  the opposite of  the  competition  that  we  con-
sider vital  for  prosperity  and  faster  growth  in  the  Community. 
Such  protection  is often demanded  in  the  name  of  consumers  but  it 
usually  serves  the  purposes  of  producers  who  are  eager  to  capture 
the  rents,  pecuniary  and  non-pecuniary,  which  protection  is offer-
ing.  In  defence of  these rents,  numerous  reasons  are  being  invoked 
- from  military security  in  NATO  to  employment  security  in  indivi-
dual  jobs.  The  nucleus  of  resistance are often public  enterprises 
(railways,  P.T.T.>  and  their  labour  unions.  Their  arguments  have 
some  appeal  in Europe's public  as  long  as governments stick  to  old 
European  traditions which  made  people  believe  that  public  enter-
prises are public  because  they  are  supposed  to  produce  public 
goods  which  markets  would  fail  to  supply  adequately.  This old  view 
has  turned  out  to  be  wrong. 
36.  Liberalisation and  deregulation  may,  therefore,  require 
privatisation.  Resistance  against privatisation comes  from  politi-
cians  in office who  are  keen  on  defending  their  power  and  influ-
ence  and  the  rents associated  with  them.  It also  comes  from  the 
employees  of  public  enterprises.  British experience  seems  to  show 
that  it is possible  to  overcome  these resistances  by  giving  ade-
quate compensation.  The  forms  of compensation  must  be  somehow 
disguised  since few  beneficiaries would  be  prepared  to  quite 
openly  admit  that  they  previously  opposed  privatisation for  quite 
selfish  (and  pecuniary>  reasons.  This  certainly raises  the  danger 
of  overcompensating  interest  groups  at  the  expense  of  the general 
public  but  there are  no  foolproof  recipes for  avoiding  it.  The 
most  important  form  of compensation  is  to  sell  an  adequate  number 
of  shares at  a  discount  price  to  the  employees  and  the  management 
of  the enterprise to  be privatised.  This gives  the  whole  issue  a 
flair  of  being  a  step  towards  workers'  participation and  people's 
capitalism.  Apart  from  this,  there must  be  ideological  commitment 
- or  political will  - on  the part of  leading  politicians.  Other-
wise  the privatisation of public enterprises is  likely  to  get 
stuck  over  the details of  each  and  every case.  However,  successful 
moves  in  one  country  <like Britain>  can  inspire  imitation  in other 
countries of  Europe,  just  as  truck  and  airline deregulation  in  the 
U.S.  are  examples  worth  to  be  closely  examined  in  the  E.C •. -22-
37.  Liberalisation of  intra-EC  trade  in services without 
deregulation  means  competition  between different  regulatory sys-
tems.  Here  only  the principle of  the  country of  origin  <or  the 
Cassis de  Dijon doctrine>  can  apply.  An  insurance  company  situated 
in  the  U.K.  will  remain subject  to  the  U.K.  regulation  and  will 
sell  a  product  with  the  trademark  "made  in Britain  .. ,  competing 
with  insurance companies  subject  to  a  different  regulatory stan-
dard.  This  kind  of competition  is exactly  the  same  as  the competi-
tion  among  suppliers of  goods  with  different quality  standards.  As 
a  process of discovery,  it will  give  a  clue  to  what  types  of stan-
dard  European  buyers  prefer  in  the field  of services.  Common 
standards for  different  service activities  may  be  elaborated after 
a  while as  European  trademarks,  but  then  they  should  be  designed 
also  with  regard  to  Europe's competitiveness  in  world  markets  for 
services. 
38.  The  position  taken  here  goes  against  the  view  dominant 
among  Member  States who  hold  that  they  need  not  permit  the  free 
import  of  insurance services before coordination has  taken  place 
<Pool  1984>.  The  reason  given  for  the  need  of  prior  coordination 
is that competition otherwise  would  be distorted.  This  again 
ignores  the role of competition as  a  search  process;  it is also 
unrealistic  because  our  diversity would  never  allow real  competi-
tion  to start from  equal  conditions or  opportunities.  It  is from 
diversity rather  than equality of conditions  that  a  division of 
labour  emerges;  a  process of competition  and  trade  may  bring  about 
an  equalisation of  some  sort  <product  prices,  factor  prices>  if 
impediments  to  trade  <transport cost,  transaction costs,  tariffs 
etc.>  are  low.  Governments  must  let competition operate first  so 
that  they  obtain  information  about  how  (in  what  direction)  the 
public  wants  to  see  the regulations harmonised.  After  all,  govern-
ments  of  Member  States are  not  the masters  but  the  servants of 
their  people.  If  the  E.C.  Commission  is not  strong  enough  to 
convince  governments,  it will  have  to  take  the  case  to  the  Court 
of Justice  in order  to  question  how  strong  the grounds  of general 
r1 
interest really are  that  are  thought  to  justi~y  impediments  to 
cross-border  traffic  in services. 
39.  The  argument  most  often put  forward  in defence  of  pro-
tective regulations  is paternalistic:  individuals,  given  the free-
dom  of  a  wider  choice,  would  be  likely  to  make  more  mistakes  as -D-
many  buyers  have  less  than full  information.  However,  mistakes  are 
unavoidable  in  any  market,  and  if the  argument  were  generalised  we 
should  not  have  the  completion of  the  internal  markets  for  goods 
either.  In  the Cassis  de  Dijon  case  the Court's  view  was  that  the 
German  requirement  (of  a  minimum  alcohol  content  of  25  per  cent 
for  fruit  liqueurs  that  excluded  foreign  suppliers>  was  not  essen-
tial  since  the  information it contained  could  be easily  ''conveyed 
to  the  purchaser  by  requiring  the display of  an  indication of 
origin and  of  the  alcohol  content  on  the  packaging  of  products" 
<E.C.  Court  of  Justice,  1979,  p.  664>.  Surely  in  insurance  and 
banking  the  information  problem  may  be  less trivial  than  in  the 
liquor  case,  but  consumers are also  more  aware  of  it.  Moreover, 
consumers  can  learn;  they  need  not  - and  will  not  - remain  so 
uninformed  as  they  can afford  it under  a  paternalistic regulatory 
system.  Finally,  if national  governments  think  that  their  own 
regulatory  system  is superior  to  that  of  their  competitors  they 
are free  to  have  it advertised  to  their  own  obedient citizens -
and  to  those  in other  member  countries. 
39.a>  At  this point,  it is tempting  to  raise a  general 
objection against  the  assimilation of financial  products  to 
goods:  in  goods  markets  it is  the product  which  has  to  meet  the 
quality standard,  in service markets  it is the  producer.  However, 
the  issue  is not  control  or  regulation itself but  whether  control 
exerted  by  the country  of origin can  be  taken  by  the country 'of 
destination as rendering  enough  protection  to  its residents.  Even 
if these residents are considered  to  be  badly  informed  or  if their 
government  is strongly paternalistic,  liberalisation may  take 
place without  prior  harmonization of controls since  liberalisation 
merely  amounts  to  removing  a  prohibition for  residents or  a  legal 
discrimination of foreign suppliers;  it does  by  no  means  exclude 
informing  residents  about  the  merits  and  de-merits of  the domestic 
and  foreign  regulatory  standards. 
Against  this  line of  reasoning  one  may  argue  that. information  is 
not  enough  to  guarantee  consumer  protection;  in additon, 
supervision of  the  providers of financial  services is required. 
This  argument  implies  that  some  E.C.  members  have  no  supervision 
at all.  If  true,  do  their citizens suffer  badly?  Would  their 
suffering  not  be  the  most  alarming  information  to  be  disseminated -24-
in  the process of  liberalisation and  a  strong  motivation  to  enjoy 
the free  access  to  the  <supposedly  better>  foreign services? 
The  ultimate defense  of  the  need  for  harmonization usually  invokes 
some  public  good  argument  referring  to  the 
11Stability of  the 
system  as  a  whole".  The  idea  of  a  "system  ..  that  has  to  be safe-
guarded  is,  of course,  diametrically opposed  to  the  notion of 
competition  as  applied  in  this  paper.  "System"  in  this sense  is 
either  a  cartel  or  a  hierarchical  order  with  a  central  governing 
body  - or  perhaps  both.  But  then  the question arises whether 
completing  the  internal  common  market  does  really aim  at  a  market 
or  rather  at  a  highly  complex  bureaucratic  arrangement. 
V  External  Liberallsation:  Recent  Trends 
40.  The  recent  record  of  worldwide  liberalisation is disap-
pointing  as  recent  assessments  show  <Donges  1986).  It  is true  that 
the  Tokyo  Round  of  negotiations conducted  in  the  framework  of  GATT 
and  completed  in  1979  produced  an  agreement  of tariff reductions 
(by  one  third  for  the  nine  major  industrial  markets  combined)  and 
established  several  "Codes  of  Conduct  ..  with  the  aim  of  stopping 
the proliferation of non-tariff barriers  <NTBs>.  But  the  subse-
quent  GATT  Ministerial  Meeting  of  November  1982  failed  to  come  out 
with  a  credible commitment  to  cut  import  restrictions and  export 
subsidies,  and  the  U.S.  Administration since  then  has  had  an 
increasingly hard  stand  against  mounting  protectionist pressures. 
41.  Tariff rates,  it is true,  are still substantial  in 
industrial  countries for  finished  manufactures  (almost  7  per  cent 
in  the E.C.,  6  per  cent  in  Japan,  5.7 per  cent  in  the U.S.),  and 
they  operate  mainly  to  the disadvantage  of developing  countries. 
It  is also  true  that  in developing  countries  they  are higher  than 
in  the  industrial  countries and  continue  to  be  non-binding  to  a 
large extent.  But  the  main  obstacles  to  freer  trade are  NTBs.  They 
include: 
•  import  quotas, 
•  "voluntary"  export  restraints  <VERs>, 
•  orderly market  agreements  <DMAs>, 
.  anti-dumping  measures  based  on  extended  definitions of  dumping, 
•  variable  import  levies, 
•  administrative guidance, 
•  subsidies. -25-
These  NTBs  are applied  discriminately 
•  in favour  of specific  domestic  sectors,  <agriculture,  textiles 
and  clothing,  footwear,  leather  products,  ceramics,  steel, 
shipbuilding,  consumer  electronics,  watches,  automobiles,  ma-
chine  tools)  and 
•  against  the  most  competitive suppliers  <Japan  and  the  NICs>. 
42.  The  share of  manufactured  imports  subject  to  NTBs  in 
1980  was  10.8 per  cent  in  the E.C.,  7.2 per  cent  in  Japan  and  6.2 
per  cent  in  the  U.S.  according  to  Balassa  and  Balassa  (1984)  who 
also  indicate  - for  the  1981-83  period  in  the  U.S.  and  the  E.C.  -
an  extension  to  other  products  that  had  made  up  6.5  and  4.1  per 
cent  respectively of  total  imports  in  1980.  More  recent  calcula-
tions  <Nogues  et al.  1986)  show  for  1983  that 
. the  E.C.  had  NTBs  on  22  per  cent of  its total  imports, 
. the u.s.  on  43  per  cent  and 
. Japan  on  12  per  cent. 
With  regard  to  manufactures,  the E.C.  and  the  U.S.  in  1983  seem  to 
have  been  more  protectionist  than  Japan  according  to  these calcu-
lations. 
43.  Apart  from  agriculture,  which  is subject  to  the  E.C. 
Common  Agricultural  Policy  <CAP>  covering  now  90  per  cent  of  farm 
output  <50  per  cent  in  the early  1960s),  the  two  sectors most 
heavily  protected  in  Europe  are textiles and  steel.  Textile  im-
ports are subject  to  the Multifibre Arrangement  <MFA>  that origi-
nated  in  1973  as  a  temporary  measure  and  was  recently  (1986> 
renewed  for  the  third  time.  The  MFA  has  been  tightened  up,  previ-
ously  under  pressure  from  the  E.C.  <MFA  II  and  III>,  recently at 
the  request  of  the  U.S.  <MFA  IV>.  Its effect  has  been 
.  to  give relief from  import  competition,  previously only  from 
actual  imports,  now  also  from  future  import  growth, 
•  to  penalise  the  most  efficient suppliers  among  developing  coun-
tries, 
•  to  discourage others  from  imitating  the frontrunners  by  creating 
uncertainty  about  market  access conditions. -26-
Several  E.C.  member  states  invoked  Article  115  of  the  Treaty  to 
derogate  from  the  common  external  tariff,  thus  eroding  the  inter-
nal  common  market  for  textiles. 
44.  As  to  steel,  the  regulatory  interventions of  the  E.C. 
Commission  initiated  in  1977  to  reduce  overcapacities  in  an  order-
ly  manner  <Davignon  Plan),  later supported  by  mandatory  produc~ion 
quotas  and  subsidies  <explicitly forbidden  under  Article  4  of  the 
Treaty  of  Paris>,  have  been  supplemented  by  protective devices 
applied  against  third  countries.  They  include  minimum  import 
prices,  anti-dumping  procedures  and  VERs  for  about  80  per  cent  of 
steel  imports.  Scheduled  to  be  phased  out  by  1985,  this regulatory 
system  has  been  prolonged  - until  the  end  of  1987  for  production 
quotas  and  import  protection,  until  1990  for  subsidies.  As  in 
textiles,  we  observe  that  temporary  relief by  pr.otection  tends  to 
become  permanent,  leads  to  a  moral  hazard  phenomenon. 
45.  The  U.S.  protectionist steel  policy,  which  started  in 
1978  with  the  trigger  price  mechanism  has  gradually  changed.  Its 
present  emphasis  is on  anti-dumping  procedures,  VERs  (with  the 
E.C.>  and  safeguard  measures  under  Article  XIX  of  GATT  with  a  view 
to  limiting  the  import  share  to  20.5  per  cent. 
46.  An  increasing  protectionist drift can also  be  recognised 
by  focussing  on  the  spread  of  VERs  to  consumer  electronics,  auto-
mobiles,  and  machine  tools.  VERs  are  the  governments'  devices for 
circumventing  the rules  they  themselves  laid  down  and  agreed  upon 
in  GATT.  They  are  now  applied  beyond  mature  and  declining  indus-
tries to  ventures  in  the  medium-tech  and  high-tech  areas.  If  we 
consider  that  governments  also  intervene at  the  upper  end  to  pick 
the  winners  and  even  t.o  "create  ..  them  we  come  to  wonder  where  the 
market  is left  to  work  for  the benefit  of  consumers  without  gov-
ernments  supporting  domestic  producers  at high  costs. 
47.  Contrary  to  widespread  perceptions,  Japan actually seems 
to  be  less mercantilist  on  these accounts  than either  Europe  or 
the  U.S ••  With  the  exception of agriculture  and  food  processing, 
Japan's  GATT  record  is fairly clean,  even  with  regard  to  textiles. 
There  may  be  clandestine protectionism  in  Japan,  but  it is diffi-
cult  to  believe that  it has  measurably  expanded  in recent  years, -27-
when  information costs declined  and  American  and  European  firms 
increased  their  presence. 
48.  Comparing  the  E.C.  and  the  U.S.,  one  has  to  consider 
that  trade policy over  here  is  less noisy  than  in  the  U.S.  where 
.Congress  is much  more  involved  than  parliaments are  in  Europe. 
With  more  publicity,  European  protectionism  might  have  been  more 
restrained  in  the public  interest. 
VI  External  Liberalisation:  The  New  GATT-Round 
49.  The  GATT  can be described  as  a  cartel  of  governments 
directed  against  domestic  producers'  groups,  including  cartels 
that  want  to  improve  the~r  terms of  trade by  preventing  their 
customers  from  having  free  access  to  foreign  competitors.  As  a 
"cartel  against cartels",  it has  a  function  similar  to  that  of 
competition policy.  The  New  GATT-Round  following  the  Punta  del 
Este  Meeting  - the  Uruguay  Round  - is an  opportunity  for  reassert-
ing  this role of  GATT.  Hence  it deserves  the full  support  of  the 
E.C.  Commissioner  responsible for  competition policy. 
50.  Like  a  cartel,  GATT  is not  very  powerful  by  itself.  It 
can  hold  the  line  by  preventing  some  protectionist mistakes.  But 
dynamism  towards freer  trade for  faster  growth  will  not  be  gener-
ated  in  GATT-Rounds.  This  is why  proponents of free  trade so  often 
call  for  leadership.  The  U.S.  does  not  appear  to  be  ready  for  such 
leadership,  given  the  overwhelming  protectionist pressures  that 
prevailed  when  the dollar  was  strong  in foreign  exchange  markets. 
This  may  have  changed  with  the decline of  the dollar.  A  lower 
exchange rate always  improves  the short  term  outlook  of  the  busi-
ness  community.  Perhaps,  the  Uruguay  Round  would  hardly  have  been 
initiated,  had  not  been  this change  in  U.S.  competitiveness. 
51.  For  Europe,  this Round  is  a  challenging  opportunity for 
the following  reasons: 
(i)  The  E.C.  can assert  itself as  an  identity  in  world  wide 
negotiations. 
(ii)  The  Commission  will  gain  prominence  over  national  governments 
as  the  main  actor,  once  Ministers  have  agreed  on  seein9  the 
Community  as  a  locomotive  in  the negotiations.  The  Commission -28-
can demonstrate  to  the  population  that  it is more  aware  of  the 
general  welfare of  consumers  and  less dependent  upon  specific 
interest groups  than  some  member  governments,  notably  before 
elections. 
(iii)  There  is new  scope  for  leadership  within  the  Commission 
because external  liberalisation is  a  worthwhile  endeavour  to  be 
coordinated  with  the  completion  of  the  Common  Internal  Market 
and  with  the  Commission~s co-operative growth  strategy. 
<iv>  In  the field  of agriculture,  the external  and  the  internal 
pressures for  a  fundamental  reform  could  be  combined  so  that  a 
historical  leap  forward  might  become  politically feasible, 
facilitated  by  the faster  growth  of  Europe
7 s  non-agricultural 
sectors and  their  absorptive capacities under  a  more  liberal 
trade  regime. 
Subsequent  paragraphs  will  concentrate  on  the  last  two  points. 
52.  The  completion of  the  Common  Internal  Market  will  have 
to  be  co-ordinated  with  external  liberalisation  in  the field  of 
services,  wherever  external  suppliers matter  and  complain.  The 
reason  is what  in  the customs  union  issue  was  called  "trade diver-
sion".  In  the  present  context  we  may  speak  of  "service diversion". 
As  is widely  known,  such  diversion results when  two  or  more  coun-
tries grant  each  other  freer  entry for  their  goods  but  not  for 
goods  from  third countries.  The  latters'  exports  thus  suffer  from 
discriminatory  treatment.  Other  things  remaining  equal,  imports 
from  third countries will  decline.  In  the  E.E.C.  case  this dis-
crimination  was  perhaps  outweighed  by  an  induced  acceleratio~ of 
economic  growth  which  brought  about  faster  import  growth.  The 
combined  effect  helped  to  convince  third countries  that  it would 
be  worthwhile  to  join the E.C. 
53.  There  is a  parallel  case resulting  from  the  internal 
liberalisation of  trade  in services.  Two  forms  of  such  liberalisa-
tion can  be  distinguished.  One  form  is the  freedom  to  establish  a 
subsidiary  in another  member  country,  subject  to  the rules  and 
regulations  which  the  host  country  applies  to  its own  nationals.  A 
British  insurance company's  subsidiary  in  Germany  can  then  do 
business  in  Germany  as  if it were  a  German  company.  The  same  would 
hold  for  a  German  company's  subsidiary  in Britain.  If this -29-
arrangement  is  limited  to  E.C.  members,  U.S.  companies  might  be  at 
a  disadvantage.  Their  European  competitors  would  receive addition-
al  scope  for  what  in  the  trade field  has been  called  ''intra-
industry"  specialisation,  a  saope  that  is denied  to  them.  The 
envisaged  complaint  is about  a  denied  opportunity.  This  loss of 
competitiveness  may  induce  them  to  press  their  own  government  to 
participate  in  the  arrangement.  In practice,  such  participation 
will  mean  a  move  towards  the  formation  of  a  kind  of  "GATT  for 
Services".  It  would  be  wise  for  E.C.  Europe  to  join such  efforts 
right  from  the start. 
54.  The  other  form  of  liberalising  internal  competition  in 
services  is freeing  cross-border  trade.  Here  the principle of  the 
country of origin has  to  be  applied.  EverT  E.C.  country  would 
permit  companies operating  in other  member  states to  freely offer 
their services  in  its own  market,  perhaps with  the proviso  that 
the  service supplied  - say  an  insurance contract  - is explicitly 
characterised  and  advertised  as  "British  ..  or  "according  to  French 
regulatory. standards''.  Companies  operating  from  third countries 
would  be  denied  this  kind  of free access.  Again,  the  U.S.  govern-
ment  would  feel  increasing  pressure  to  obtain  the  same  concession 
for  its companies  in  exchange for  the  concession of  a  free sale of 
European  company's  services on  the  U.S.  market.  The  difference  to 
traditional  trade diversion again  stems  from  the fact  that  the 
non-European  companies  had  no  access  whatsoever  before;  they  are 
being  denied  an  opportunity  that  their  European  competitors gain. 
55.  The  liberalisation of air  transportation services,  to 
the extent  that  it is foreseen  in  the  White  Paper,  is a  different 
case for  a  deplorable reason:  in  this field,  Europe  has  a~very 
long  way  to  go  - with  much  adjustment  before  it could  be  said  to 
have  a  market  comparable  to  the  U.S.  in  both  scope  and  degree  of 
competition.  It is true that  the  same  seems  to  hold  for  insurance 
services but  airlines,  other  than  insurance,  are mostly  subject  to 
government  ownership  or  to  national  security considerations  <at 
least  in rhetoric).  Moreover,  the deregulation of airline services 
in  the U.S.  was  limited  to  U.S.  carriers,  and  Europe  and  its 
airlines  - for  obvious  reasons  - never  seriously asked  to  have 
access  to  the  U.S.  market  on  the same  conditions as  U.S.  carriers. 
The  U.S.  would  have  immediately  demanded  reciprocity;  this reci-
procity could  have  never  been granted  without  internal -30-
liberalisation.  Nevertheless,  it seems  that steps  towards  internal 
liberalisation would  increase Europe's  bargaining  power:  with  a 
more  liberal  internal  regime,  Europe  would  have  more  to  offer  and 
could,  therefore,  hope  to  make  substantial  gains  in  terms  of freer 
access  for  its airline services  in  world  markets.  This  gain  would 
be  of substantial  value,  given  the  high  income  elasticity of 
demand  for  these services.  The  E.C.  Commission  might  wish  to 
induce  economists  to  have  a  closer  look  at  this subject  which  is 
complicated  and,  therefore,  dominated  by  insiders  who  may  not  be 
able  to  completely detach  themselves  from  the  influence of  vested 
interests.  An  alternative would  be  to  urge  for  a  sweeping  politi-
cal  decision  in  favour  of airline deregulation  and  worldwide 
competition  on  the  grounds  that  such  a  move  would  be  essential 
and  a  test  - for  Europe's  economic  dynamism. 
56.  Agriculture,  to  many  economi/sts  and  laymen  alike,  ap-
pears  to  be  hopelessly  unsuitable as  a  subject  of  liberalisation 
efforts.  Atavistic anxieties about  basic  needs  merge  with  vested 
interests of  a  well  organised  political  pressure group.  Everything 
in  this field  seems  to  have  been  overdone  to  an  extent  that  it is 
turning  into  its negative:  overproduction  instead of starvation, 
wasting  instead  of economising  resources,  deterioration of quality 
instead  of  product  improvement,  peasant  revolts  instead  of  ap-
peasement.  Some  economists  have  warned  against  this decades  ago. 
Now  the agricultural  perversities are spoiling  Europe's  image 
among  the population within  and  outside  the E.C ••  Financially,  a 
good  European  is  to  be  taxed  as  a  notorious  "Europayer."  In  the 
Uruguay-Round,  the  issue of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy will 
come  up  again  and  again,  surely with  detrimental  effects on  other 
fields.  A  financial  breakdown  internally  and  a  breakdown  of  trade 
negotiations  internationally have  become  imminent  threats.  The 
time  of  complacency  has  run  out.  A  stumbling  bloc  is to  be  re-
moved.  Most  people  agree.  But  they  also  stick  to  the defeatist 
belief that  the sensible  is  impossible.  This  is  a  situation where 
nothing  short  of  a  deep  crisis can  produce  a  turnaround.  It  may 
endanger  the  GATT  negotiations.  No  subject  for  macroeconomists? 
Surely,  it is a  macro-problem  similar  to  that of  the  labour  mar-
ket:  The  level  and  structure of agricultural  prices do  play  the 
same  distorting role  in product  markets  as  the  level  and  structure 
of  wages  in factor  markets. -31-
57.  There  will  be  no  other  lasting solution  to  the  agricul-
tural  problem  than  a  compliance  with  the dictates of  the  world 
market.  And  if governments  believe  that  incomes  presently  earned 
by  agricultural  producers should  be  protected,  to  the extent  they 
are rents  measured  against  the  background  of  world  market  prices, 
direct  income  support  could  be  offered  to  those  incapable of 
adjusting  their activities.  The  technical  issues  involved  cannot 
be  discussed  in  this context.  Nor  is it possible  to  present  - and 
evaluate  the costs of  - alternative schemes.  But  it is worth  re-
peating  what  so  often has  been stated,  i.e.  that direct  income 
subsidies are  a  cheaper  form  of  incomes  policy  than  any  scheme 
involving  prices  and  hence  a  misallocation of  resources  in addi-
tion  to  what  the  consumer  has  to  pay.  It  would  be  irresponsible if 
Europe  added  to  these  wastes  the  loss of growth  opportunities  that 
would  arise should  its stubbornness  in agricultural  policy  lead  to 
a  breakdown  of  GATT  negotiations. 
VII  Liberalisation and  Macro-Economic  Policies 
58.  A  liberalisation of  trade  in  goods  and  services,  inter~ 
nal  and  external,  would  be  a  positive supply  shock.  The  empirical 
evidence referred  to  above  (para  20 et seq.)  indicates what  the 
order  of  magnitude  is  likely  to  be:  Europe  could  expect  an  in-
crease  in  the rate of  growth  of potential  output  in  the  range of 
two  percentage points.  The  figure  may  be  higher  for  some  countries 
and  regions with  a  high  potential  for  catching-up;  it may  be  lower 
for  the  more  advanced  and  prosperous  regions  and  for  countries 
that  are ahead  of others. 
59.  What  also  matters for  policy  formation  is  the  time 
profile of  the  improved  growth  prospects.  For  lack  of  evidence  we 
have  to  speculate.  One  factor  is the static allocation- or  inte-
gration  - effect:  bits and  pieces of  the sheltered  (domestic> 
sector will  become  part  of  the  international  sector;  in  the pro-
cess of  transition,  their  productivity will  increase.  This  is the 
counterpart  of  the  pains arising  from  the  induced  structural 
adjustment.  This effect  will  peter  out  after  the  transition period 
when  the  liberalisation process  has  come  to  an  end.  Then  there  is 
another  effect  which  will  appear  less plausible  to  non-evolution-
ary  economists.  It  is not  the effect of  reallocation,  or  of  the 
competitive pressure  bringing  about  reallocation,  but  the result -32-
of  the  higher  competitive pressures  that  are permanently  at  work 
in  what  we  call  the  international  sector  in contrast  to  the  domes-
tic or  sheltered sector.  Included  in  this competition  is  a  lot of 
what  is sometimes  called  "unfair"  competition or  "dumping"  at 
prices equalling short  term  marginal  costs or  what  Schumpeter 
seemed  to  mean  by  the  "gales of  competition".  Although  governments 
will  be  hard  pressed  to  tame  this  kind  of  competition,  we  can 
trust  that  participants  in  a  market  that  is as  anonymous  as  the 
world  market  - with  new  NICs  coming  up  all  the  time  - will  always 
attempt  to  circumvent  the written  and  unwritten rules of explicit 
and  implicit  protectionism.  This point  supports  the  view  that  some 
growth  acceleration will  be permanent.;On  the other  hand,  it has 
to  be  admitted  that  such  circumvention! is going  on all  the  time 
and  that  the protection  we  measure  may  not  be  as effective as  it 
appears  at first sight.  However,  the  evidence  quoted  refers only 
to  the protection as  we  measure  it and  it relates  to  the  growth 
performance.  In  this sense  the  two  sides are  likely  to  balance. 
There  is perhaps  a  more  important  qualification:  were  the effec-
tive rates of  protection that  prevailed  in  the past  and  that 
underly  the calculations not  possibly  higher  than  those  we  are 
going  to  tackle  in  the future?  Without  further  research  we  have  to 
admit  ignorance.  Apart  from  this,  the  actual  acceleration of 
growth  will  also  depend  upon  how  far  towards  free  trade Europe  -
and  the  world  - will  be  actually prepared  to  go. 
60.  This  paper  is  a  plea  for  moving  ahead  courageously  and 
on  a  broad  front. 
<i>  The  courage for  the  internal  liberalisation measures  and  for 
E.C.  leadership  in  the  Uruguay-Round  can  be  safely based  on  the 
recognition  that  Europe  has  a  growth  potential  to  exploit. 
(ii)  This  growth  potential  can  be  widened  by  early measures  to 
make  markets  more  flexible  and  responsive  to  relative scarcities 
- the  labour  market  and  the agricultural  markets  not  excluded. 
(iii)  Tax  reforms  in  imitation of  the  present  U.S.  example  will 
greatly help  to  improve  incentives  and  to  raise supply  respon-
siveness. -33-
<iv>  Decision  makers  and  negotiators  on  the  liberalisation front 
will  have  to  operate on  the  assumption  that overall  demand  is 
certain  to  develop  along  with  supply  responsiveness  - in  up-
swings  ahead  of  supply,  in  unavoidable  slowdown  periods  with  a 
short  time  lag;  and  monetary-fiscal  policy  should  allow  for  the 
increased  supply  responsiveness  in  a  way  that  makes  freer  im-
ports  and  more  import  competition  a  welcome  public  good  for 
maintaining  price  level  stability. 
<v>  Leadership  is required  for  such  a  movement  on  a  broad  front 
because each  segment  (or  sector>  will  go  ahead  only  if there  is 
enough  certainty that  others will  make  the  complementary  steps. 
Partial  steps are futile,  at  best  they are second  best.  An 
important  implication for  econometric  modelling  and  policy 
simulations  is that  changing  a  single policy variable  <ceteris 
paribus>  is  inferior  to  comp'aring  well  composed  strategy alter-
natives  (mutatis mutandis).  In  this sense  the  above  considera-
tions fill  a  lacunae  in  the  Commissiono:s  "Co-operative  Growth 
Strategy". 
Without  a  coordinated  policy,  Europe  may  still have faster  eco-
nomic  growth  and  less unemployment  sometime  in  the  future;  but  we 
can definitely have  it a  couple of years earlier  if we  succeed  in 
mutually  convincing  ourselves  that concertation along  these  lines 
is possible and  worth  the effort. -34.-
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